The Truth about Flight BA038
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Wednesday, 09 July 08 - 06:28 PM (GMT) By Flight BA038 in BA038 |
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These wild claims by British Airways have angered many people in the industry and it's about time the truth was known. The authors of this little website must remain anonymous, but at least our consciences will be cleared.
The Truth About Flight BA038
The authorities already know what happened. There is evidence that points to one thing causing this incident, and one thing only. Pilot Error.
Boeing 777s, like many modern aircraft are continually sending vital monitoring information to ground stations around the world in real time. This one would have been sending information to British Airways (the operator) and to Rolls Royce (the engine manufacturer). There is seldom need to wait for the confirmation of the black box. If there was any indication of major systems failure then there would have been worldwide grounding of 777 fleets. There is no such action taking place.
The problem is something that is frequently discussed in simulator training, and something that an experienced captain would know how to deal with.
BA038 was being held over Heathrow, the pilot was offered a earlier landing slot by ATC, and took it immediately. Because of his location he had to make a high and fast descent.
In order to slow the plane down he pulled back the throttles to idle. A 777’s computers systems are very clever. The plane knows that it takes as long as 12 seconds for engines to reach full power from idle, and so it defaults the engines to run at approx 45% thrust when on an approach. Whilst running at 45% thrust the engines can reach max power in 2 or 3 seconds. In order to override the pilot has to manually pull back on the throttle, and the plane will try and put the power back up to 45%, so the manual override has to be VERY intentional and repeated every time the plan compensates.
When the landing gear went down and the flaps went up, the airframe would have lost momentum very quickly and begun to stall. With the gear down and engines idling this would have happened very rapidly. In a stall the plane would pivot up and down whilst the pilots fight to get control over it. The pilot would put the engines up to full thrust to recover the airframe. But from idle it will take 12 seconds for the engines to respond. By this time the plane is pitched at a high angle.
At a high angle the engines will not get the air intake they need, but they are being brought up to full power. The engines will stall because of the turbulent air. They will make a huge noise (I can’t emphasise the word HUGE enough). They will bang. They will spit. This is not unusual and can be expected.
At some point some thrust from the engines may or may not have been enough to recover the airframe from the stall, but too late alas to stop the plane smashing into the end of the runway.
This pilot has been quoted as saying he lost all power. By ‘power’ he means ‘thrust’, and he didn’t lose it. He should have known it would take 12 seconds for the planes idling engines to provide him with thrust again.
You have witnesses and passengers commenting on the extra loud engines and the banging noises.
You have passengers commenting on an unusually steep descent.
How could it be avoided:
Pilots should know that they should not override the planes decision on maintaining 45% thrust. The airbrake can be utilised if needed, and if that is not good enough then a go-around procedure can be initiated on a 777 at the touch of one button on the control yoke. There are captains of 777’s all round the world that have to slap the First Officers hands when they reach to reduce the throttle. It is dangerous. It will kill people.
There is a lot of pressure on Pilots making a missed approach or go around. Typically they will be spoken to by a senior pilot at their company, they will have cost the company money, but most of all they will be teased in the airport bars round the world. The unfortunate result of which is the pilot would rather risk a dodgy landing, than execute a perfectly safe go-around procedure, and in the this case we speculate that this is exactly what happened. Far from being experienced he seems more concerned with getting a bad rep from his peers.
More needs to be done to remove the stigma from using a go-around procedure. We would have hoped that it would not be in existence in BA, but you see it elsewhere in the world. The same thing happened in Java last march to a Indonesian 737, (Pilot Error already blamed here), and an Air France Airbus in Toronto in August 05 (look how much effort Air France are going to cover a Pilot Error).
I would prefer the pilot feels embarrassed than a plane load of innocent people get killed.
In this case the passengers can thank the Boeing for their lives not British Airways! If it wasn’t for such a well built aircraft there is a high chance the pilot would have killed them all.
The pilot is quoted as having 20 years experience at BA. Obviously the 777 is not that old, and perhaps he is a new convert to the aircraft type?
So come on BA -
We don't see Boeing or Rolls Royce telling everyone how great they are, but Boeing, Rolls AND BA already know the truth. BA should put their hands up and tell people what they know. Above all the pilots should stop receiving praise.Accident to Boeing 777-236, G-YMMM at London Heathrow Airport on 17 January 2008
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Monday, 07 July 08 - 02:30 PM (GMT) By Justin Dean in BA038 |
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Initial Report AAIB Ref: EW/C2008/01/01
Accident
| Aircraft Type and Registration: | Boeing 777-236, G-YMMM |
| No & Type of Engines: | 2 Rolls-Royce RB211 Trent 895-17 turbofan engines |
| Year of Manufacture: | 2001 |
| Date & Time: | 17 January 2008 at 1243 hrs |
| Location: | Undershoot RWY 27L, London Heathrow Airport |
| Type of Flight: | Commercial Air Transport (passenger) |
| Persons on Board: | Crew - 16 Passengers - 136 |
| Injuries: | Crew - 4 (minor) Passengers - 1 (serious) Passengers - 8 (minor) |
| Nature of Damage: | Substantial |
| Information Source: | AAIB Field Investigation |
Following an uneventful flight from Beijing, China, the aircraft was established on an ILS approach to Runway 27L at London Heathrow. Initially the approach progressed normally, with the Autopilot and Autothrottle engaged, until the aircraft was at a height of approximately 600 ft and 2 miles from touch down. The aircraft then descended rapidly and struck the ground, some 1,000 ft short of the paved runway surface, just inside the airfield boundary fence. The aircraft stopped on the very beginning of the paved surface of Runway 27L. During the short ground roll the right main landing gear separated from the wing and the left main landing gear was pushed up through the wing root. A significant amount of fuel leaked from the aircraft but there was no fire. An emergency evacuation via the slides was supervised by the cabin crew and all occupants left the aircraft, some receiving minor injuries.
The AAIB was notified of the accident within a few minutes and a team of Inspectors including engineers, pilots and a flight recorder specialist deployed to Heathrow. In accordance with the established international arrangements the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) of the USA, representing the State of Design and Manufacture of the aircraft, was informed of the event. The NTSB appointed an Accredited Representative to lead a team from the USA made up of investigators from the NTSB, the FAA and Boeing. A Boeing investigator already in the UK joined the investigation on the evening of the event, the remainder of the team arrived in the UK on Friday 18th January. Rolls-Royce, the engine manufacturer is also supporting the investigation, an investigator having joined the AAIB team.
Activity at the accident scene was coordinated with the Airport Fire and Rescue Service, the Police, the British Airports Authority and British Airways to ensure the recovery of all relevant evidence, to facilitate the removal of the aircraft and the reinstatement of airport operations.
The flight crew were interviewed on the evening of the event by an AAIB Operations Inspector and the Flight Data Recorder (FDR), Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) and Quick Access Recorder (QAR) were removed for replay. The CVR and FDR have been successfully downloaded at the AAIB laboratories at Farnborough and both records cover the critical final stages of the flight. The QAR was downloaded with the assistance of British Airways and the equipment manufacturer. All of the downloaded information is now the subject of detailed analysis.
Examination of the aircraft systems and engines is ongoing.
Initial indications from the interviews and Flight Recorder analyses show the flight and approach to have progressed normally until the aircraft was established on late finals for Runway 27L. At approximately 600 ft and 2 miles from touch down, the Autothrottle demanded an increase in thrust from the two engines but the engines did not respond. Following further demands for increased thrust from the Autothrottle, and subsequently the flight crew moving the throttle levers, the engines similarly failed to respond. The aircraft speed reduced and the aircraft descended onto the grass short of the paved runway surface.
The investigation is now focussed on more detailed analysis of the Flight Recorder information, collecting further recorded information from various system modules and examining the range of aircraft systems that could influence engine operation.
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